

Reshef Agam-Segal (Auburn University)
Secondary Senses: Self-Legislation and Other Figurative Dramas

Plato, Aristotle, and Kant faced a similar problem. They held that the soul was a basic unity, but talked about different parts in the soul. Kant, in particular, wrote about the noumenal part of us that legislates to the phenomenal. This may seem to imply that these sub-parts ought themselves to be understood as yet more basic unities, which seems to undermine the idea that the unity of the soul is indeed basic. I elucidate a conception of the mind in which figurative ways of expression are sometimes essential to understanding the mind. I clarify the usefulness of Wittgenstein's idea of secondary sense in relation to Kant's idea that we legislate for ourselves. My claim is that the idea of self-legislation is best understood as a secondary use of language, i.e. as an irreducibly figurative form of language: a figure of speech that does not have a literal equivalent, and is therefore essential.

Ignacio Moya Arriagada (Universidad Central de Chile - La Serena)
The Extended Self as a Centre of Gravity

In this paper, I propose a concept of personal identity that offers possible answers to some of the more pressing questions that arise in the philosophy of personal identity. Where does the self go when a person has Alzheimer's? When a person has amnesia? While in each of these cases, the person is unable to claim an identity for herself, she continues to be individualized and identified by those around her. What does this tell us about 'our' identities? By resorting primarily to David Chalmers, I contend that it is possible to construe a concept of the 'extended self as a centre of gravity' that makes it possible to answer the above puzzles. I do this by arguing that a person cannot 'lose' her identity because identities are not 'ours' to possess or lose.

Lauren Ashwell (Bates College)
Knowing Our Desires

Despite the fact that the term 'introspection' is used to name the distinctive first-personal method via which we know our own mental states, it is now widely held that we do not look inwards to find out what we believe. Instead, it is thought that we look outwards towards the world; we attend to the objects and properties and states of affairs that our beliefs are about. Self-knowledge, then, comes from looking away from the self. Recent work has tried to extend this outward-looking account from belief to desire. In this paper I argue that introspective knowledge of our desires often requires us to pay attention to ourselves, and not just the external world.

Camille Atkinson (Oregon State University)
Class, Culture and The Self

There are two basic questions I wish to explore: One, what is the relationship between social class and personal identity? Can class-consciousness or heritage be as significant as racial or ethnic identity? Two, to what extent is class culturally determined or dependent on something other than socio-economic conditions? Is it enough to define privilege or the lack thereof strictly in terms of material wealth? Or, are class identifications more complex, variable and subtle? I will be using anecdotal evidence and experiences of my own, along with the work of Franz Boas, Alain Locke and Pierre Bourdieu, to respond. The former two philosophers were among the first to discuss problems of race, human types and culture in terms of social relations and environmental as well as geographical conditions. While Bourdieu offers a complex account of class by distinguishing three forms of capital and examining its various manifestations.

H. E. Baber (University of San Diego)
What, Me Worry?: Selves, Cohabitation, and the Problem of the Many

According to what Rebecca Roach calls *the common sense view*, what matters for survival is identity. Rebecca Roach suggests that David Lewis' response to Parfit in defense of the common-sense view fails because, given the character of personnel involved in branching cases, we cannot infer that what matters for their survival is what matters for us. While pre-fission stage-sharing allows persons to survive fission, such cases tell us nothing about what matters for survival for ordinary people or about the correctness of the common-sense view. The puzzle cases on which Parfit and Lewis rely force us to reflect on the nature of our concern for our future survival. According to Roach, however, we cannot have such concern in the requisite sense if our survival is guaranteed. Since the survival of individuals involved in fission cases is guaranteed through fission, he claims, they cannot be concerned about their survival in the requisite sense. I argue, however, that given the criterion for individuating persons and the account of self-interested concern she assumes, both ordinary people and those destined to undergo fission are in the same boat. Our survival, like theirs, is guaranteed but given any reasonable understanding of self-interested concern, neither we nor they should be sanguine about that. To the extent that we are concerned about our futures and, in particular, about our future survival, our concern is the same.

James Blackmon (San Francisco State University)
Minds and Material Composition

The human brain is a scattered material object commonly held to be the physical basis of conscious mental properties or states. I argue that this view leads to some surprising absurdities. To avoid them, we must reject the view that the material of the brain alone instantiates the mind and embrace a theory that accounts for features of the world that are strictly not material. I suggest that the most plausible alternative is to acknowledge the apparently essential role played by energy transfer unmediated by matter.

Stephen Blackwood (Wilfrid Laurier University)
Expressivism, Self-Knowledge, and Critical Rationality

In this paper I discuss two opposing approaches to the explanation of the unique status of what is normally called self-knowledge. According to Rockney Jacobsen's reading of Wittgenstein, our ability to authoritatively self-ascribe our own present-tense mental states is explained by the fact that sincere utterances of self-ascriptions express the very states they self-ascribe. In contrast to this non-epistemic account, a number of philosophers (for example, Sidney Shoemaker, Tyler Burge, and Akeel Bilgrami) have recently argued that our self-ascriptions do express a form of knowledge (justified true beliefs about our first-order mental states), the unique character of which is explained by the essential role that knowledge plays in critical rationality. I argue that what I call this supervisory model of self-knowledge faces serious difficulties that not only undermine it but also reinforce Jacobsen's Wittgensteinian non-epistemic account.

Stephan Blatti (University of Memphis)
Another Argument for Animalism

The view commonly known as animalism asserts that we are human organisms. On this view, each of us is identical to a particular instance of the *Homo sapiens* species. The standard argument for this view is known as the "thinking animal argument." While it's a good argument, and I'll devote some time to considering its merits, I believe it can be buttressed by an even less contentious argument that illustrates how the case for animalism piggy-backs on the credibility of evolutionary theory. So I'll present this argument, show how it complements the standard argument, and address a variety of likely objections.

Tony H. Y. Cheng (CUNY Graduate Center)
Self-Identification and a Puzzle about Mental Ownership

'Immunity to error through misidentification (IEM)' has long been intuitive but controversial. Recently, Caleb Liang and Timothy Lane (*Analysis* 2009) invoke empirical studies to argue against IEM. I think the case they elaborate on – 'somatoparaphrenia' – does put much pressure on IEM, but rather than abandoning it altogether, I will use this pathology as a tool to sharpen our understanding of IEM. Patients of somatoparaphrenia have a sense of alienation from certain part(s) of their bodies. This is at odds with IEM. To reconcile the tension, I improve our formulation of IEM by modifying those from Sydney Shoemaker, David Rosenthal and James Pryor. Contrary to the received view that Shoemaker's thesis is a contemporary version of a thesis Wittgenstein presented in the *Blue Book*, I argue that somatoparaphrenia helps us see that Wittgenstein's version is actually preferable. I also use cases such as 'dental fear' and 'extreme empathy' to strengthen my case.

Elijah Chudnoff (University of Miami)
Gettier Cases

The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The "Gettier Problem problem," according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I argue that the problem with the Gettier Problem is that it requires us to articulate conditions that suffice for knowledge even if those conditions are non-explanatory.

Scott Clifton (University of Washington-Seattle)
Branching vs. Non-branching Models and Moderate Moralism

Noël Carroll advocates moderate moralism, which holds that in some instances moral judgments can affect aesthetic judgments. In this paper I present his view, as well as a criticism made by James Anderson and Jeffrey Dean. I argue that their criticism is of the branching structure of Carroll's position. I note that even when this is pointed out, Carroll wishes to preserve the structure by arguing against the priority of sufficient reason. I end the paper by suggesting a way that a moderate moralist can adopt a non-branching model, which needn't take a stand on what kind of reason is apt.

Cynthia D. Coe (Central Washington University)
One's Place in the Sun: Gender, Sovereignty, and Agency

Emmanuel Levinas frequently invokes a passage from Pascal to critique the glorification of sovereignty: "This is my place is the sun. That is how the usurpation of the whole world began". This image also resonates with Foucault's rather different critique of sovereignty as an ideal. But neither Levinas nor Foucault provide a very detailed alternative account of human agency. My suggestion in this paper is that the efforts of recent feminist ethicists to reconceive autonomy can be linked to the Levinasian and Foucauldian critiques, in order to radically undermine not only the ideal of sovereignty itself but the conceptual framework that sustains it.

Therese Scarpelli Cory (Seattle University)
Reflexivity and Self-Awareness in Aquinas

This paper explores the ways in which, for Thomas Aquinas, the reflexivity of the human soul shapes two key aspects of the experience of human selfhood: the inseparability of consciousness and intentionality, and the unity of consciousness. Aquinas takes his view of the soul's reflexivity from both Neoplatonic and Aristotelian sources. From the *Liber de causis* he adopts the principle that whatever is immaterial is entirely available to itself cognitively and can thus return to itself completely. From the Aristotelian commentary tradition, Aquinas inherits the view that because intellect and its object are one in the act of cognition, to cognize something is always to cognize oneself as the cognizing subject. Fusing both these strands of thought, Aquinas elaborates a theory of reflexivity according to which the soul is aware of itself in all its intentional acts, and *only* in its intentional acts. Self-awareness thus always occurs in the context of cognizing some other: the human person perceives its objects from the point of view of a subject, and perceives itself as a subject in every act of understanding some object. Aquinas then applies these principles to human memory in order to provide an account for the unity of consciousness across time, insofar as the memory of oneself cognizing *A* is part of one's memory of *A*.

Charles Debord (University of Kentucky)
Kant, Fichte, and the Act of the I

This essay focuses on a question crucial to Kant's philosophy and foundational to that of his disciple Johann Fichte, i.e., what can theoretical philosophy tell us about the existence and identity of the self? In this paper I argue that Fichte's conception of the pure I as expounded in his 1794 presentation of the *Wissenschaftslehre* is logically consistent with the account Kant gives in the first *Critique* on three points: first, concerning the active nature of pure apperception; second, concerning the distinction between pure and empirical apperception; and third, concerning their skepticism of any positive conclusions about the noumenal content of the pure I. As to the relation of the pure I to its object, however, I argue that Kant affirms the conceptual priority of the former to the latter while Fichte denies it.

David Demoss (Pacific University)
The Empty and Extended Self

This essay is the first step in a larger project of mine to show how to use a contemporary model of the extended self to reinterpret the Buddhist model of the empty self, and to do so in a way that embraces and illuminates the aims of Buddhism: to stop the craving that causes suffering and to act with socially engaged compassion. The idea is to contribute to a twenty-first century Buddhism. In this essay I will argue that the Buddhist claim that the self is empty is akin to Andy Clark's claim that the mind is extended. How and why the self is empty in the Buddhist sense can be usefully explained and elaborated if we assume that the mind is extended in Clark's sense. I will be appealing primarily to two texts: Clark's *Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension* (2008) and Guy Newland's *Introduction to Emptiness: As Taught in Tsong-kha-pa's Great Treatise on the Stages of the Path* (2008).

Aaron P. Elliott (San Diego State University)
Continuity but not Connectedness: An Examination of the Requirements of the R-relation

Derek Parfit advocates for a reductionist view of persons and a psychological criterion of personal identity. His account of personal identity requires what he calls the R-relation. David Lewis subscribes to a similar view and likewise accepts that the R-relation plays a crucial role in personal identity. Lewis suggests an additional relation, the I-relation, is crucial for personal identity, and that these relations are co-extensive. However, Parfit's formulation of the R-relation involves an unnecessary and implausible reliance on direct connection of mental states. When direct connection is removed from the R-relation problems arise for Lewis's analysis of the I-relation. A further adjustment is required to resolve these issues. This adjustment additionally frees Parfit from some of the implausible moral implications of the R-

relation, and does not require Lewis to make some unnatural claims about the I-relation, such as that it admits of degrees.

David Ellis (Boston College)

Life as a Looking-Glass: The Ambiguity of Self and Language in Plotinus

I perform a close reading of Plotinus' Ennead V 3 [49] 1-3, inquiring into what language is, given its activity takes place within an ambiguous being: what this being is, given language takes place within it. If the self is located between sense and intelligence, if it wanders and must navigate between both, what role(s) does language play in something occupying that condition? With Plotinus, I attempt to unfold how language is the ambiguous condition at work, is its performance of busying itself with the sensible in terms of the intelligible. This implies the self is always with other beings, which leads me to explore the different ways this is possible, especially by focusing on the distinction between saying "something about something" and "saying something". The former is logical because it is about grouping likenesses and separating dissimilarities; the latter is metaphorical, which likens dissimilarities and insists on their similarity.

Emily Esch (College of Saint Benedict and Saint John's University)

Reconceiving the Self

The empirical research from the last two decades undermines some of the core assumptions of traditional philosophical conceptions of the self and should shake our faith in traditional philosophical methods. In this paper, I focus on the work of psychologists and neuroscientists that suggests that much of our behavior, feelings, and judgments are driven by unconscious mental states. The fact that these unconscious mental states are largely inaccessible to first person introspection should make us wary of relying solely on the first-person perspective when it comes to understanding the self. I discuss and reject two models that are suggested by the empirical literature, and lay out the benefits of an account based in our nature as creatures with a particular evolutionary past.

Ty Fagan (University of Illinois, Urbana-Champaign)

Self-ignorance and Self-improvement: Sketching a Reevaluation

In this paper, I will explore the phenomenon of self-ignorance in the context of self-improvement. At least since the Delphic command *gnothi seauton*—"Know thyself!"—and certainly since Socrates, the idea that gaining self-knowledge is moral (and not just epistemic) progress has been part of philosophical orthodoxy. The corollary to this bit of doctrine is that self-ignorance is something to be avoided, and never willfully sought. I will sketch a challenge to this orthodox view, first by describing some ways self-ignorance might, in the right circumstances, actually help our projects of self-building and self-improvement. Then, with a fuller and fairer picture of the role self-ignorance can play in human life, I will make some gestures toward the moral reevaluation it deserves: one that properly reckons both its potential for instrumental value and its more fundamental role in the experience of free agency.

Jeremy Fischer (University of Washington)

Pride and the Desire for Self-Sufficiency

I lay the groundwork for a descriptive and normative account of pride by examining why the viciously proud are typically concerned with considerations of self-sufficiency. I explain this concern with the help of a distinction between "ideal-desires," which take the form, "I want that I meet my personal ideal of . . .," and all other ("non-ideal") desires. I argue that the proud are disposed to care about the objects of these ideal-desires, and the excessively proud excessively so. Moreover, I argue that the stoic concern with self-sufficiency typically depends upon a morally dubious prioritization of individualistic personal ideals over collective personal ideals. I conclude with some remarks about why the quest for self-sufficiency that drives the vicious forms of pride is so insidious.

J. M. Fritzman (Lewis & Clark College)
Nussbaum On Cosmopolitanism Versus Patriotism

I criticize Nussbaum's views on cosmopolitanism and patriotism.

Jeff Gauthier (University of Portland)
Just Bargains: When is Consent Coerced?

While virtually all social theorists agree that the consent of a disadvantaged party to coercive offers cannot count as legitimate, what counts as coercion remains in dispute. Even if consent to an offer such as “your money or your life” is obviously coerced, that consent under unequal bargaining conditions is similarly coercive remains in doubt. While advocates of workers’ and women’s rights have often argued that unjust background conditions render a broad range of employment and sexual offers made to workers and women respectively coercive, many contractarians resist the claim that oppressive background conditions invalidate the consent of disadvantaged parties, even if such offers would be rejected in other circumstances. I argue that these arguments for validating consent under oppressive background conditions fail to recognize significant harms that such consent entails for the material welfare and autonomy of the disadvantaged parties. In particular, consensual transactions may reinforce the “non-ideal circumstances” that ostensibly necessitate them.

Adam Green (Saint Louis University)
Mindreading and Self-Knowledge

A popular thesis in the contemporary discussion of self-knowledge is that introspection is transparent. As Gareth Evans famously put it, if someone were to ask whether one thinks there will be a third world war, one answers the question not by searching one's mind for a thought one can observe. Instead, one attends to whatever indications there may be that there will or will not be a war. In this paper, I argue against the transparency model of self-knowledge. I do so by drawing attention to the transparency model's need for an inferential process to turn transparent thoughts into self-knowledge, just as Dretske posits. I use parallels between mindreading and self-knowledge in order to show that it is very hard to account for how one might make the inferences the transparency model requires without appealing to the very kinds of abilities posited by the model's chief rival.

Carl Hammer (Baruch College, CUNY)
Constructivist Publicity of Reasons

Christine Korsgaard and R. Jay Wallace have both recently argued for a publicity of reasons thesis – the claim that reasons have some open-ended structure, such that normative force extends across the boundaries of persons. Wallace defends the publicity thesis by arguing that it best explains a pattern of corresponding reasons. I offer my own explanation of the pattern that is based on social relations and shared intentions. I argue that my analysis is a better explanation and makes the publicity thesis more explainable in terms of social normativity.

Avram Hiller (Portland State University)
Identity Problems for Narrative Selves

A significant number of philosophers as well as scholars in other disciplines hold the *narrative conception of the self* (NCS). According to NCS, the self does not exist on its own but rather exists insofar as it is constructed by a narrative. I argue that NCS is untenable for a fairly elementary reason which has gone unnoticed in the literature. Proponents of NCS hold a radical view about the non-existence of real selves while holding a quite naïve view about the existence and identity of characters in narratives, and I argue

that these are incompatible. Just as there are problems accounting for the identity of genuine selves which motivate the move towards NCS, there are problems accounting for the identity of characters in narratives.

Benjamin Visscher Hole IV (University of Washington)

Nussbaum on Moral Perception and the Priority of the Particular

Martha Nussbaum's account of moral perception holds that we perceive moral particulars prior to ethical principles. First, I explain her account. Second, I present a dilemma: our perception of moral particulars is either non-inferential or it is inferential. If Nussbaum accepts a non-inferential interpretation, then she is vulnerable to an unsavory position on moral epistemology – one that invites intuitionism and further invites relativism. But if she accepts a non-inferential account, then the moral particular is not prior to the ethical principle. I suggest that her better option is to grab the second horn. This move avoids the problems of the first horn without sacrificing her neo-Aristoelian commitments or her overarching view that literature plays an ineliminable role in moral enquiry. At the same time, this move renders her priority thesis trivial.

Robert J. Howell (Southern Methodist University)

The Hard Problem of the Self

It is difficult to know just what philosophers are worried about when they discuss the existence of the self. Debates tend to become terminological and somewhat trivial. I propose, however, that there is a non-trivial problem of self that is raised by the fact that the mind's boundaries appear to be vague. Drawing on the "extended minds hypothesis" and the odd results of selective stimulation of commissurotomy patients, I argue that it is not obvious that a non-vague notion of self is available. I suggest, however, that some hope might be found in the unity of phenomenal consciousness. If this path is taken, there will be close ties between "the problem of the self" and "the problem of consciousness."

Ramona Ilea and Susan Hawthorne (Pacific University and Mount Holyoke College)

Beyond Service Learning: Civic Engagement in Philosophy Classes

This presentation will defend the notion of civic engagement as activism and describe a type of civic engagement project that audience members can implement in their philosophy classes. We will begin by explaining the theoretical backing of this project and show how it is different than traditional service learning assignments. Although students often find this project challenging, they also see it as deeply rewarding; they have been impressed with their results and the skills they develop. We will show how to implement the project and share our assignments and resources with audience members. Before ending, we will demonstrate the project's effectiveness and address both theoretical and practical objections.

Peter Jaworski (Bowling Green State University)

Ownership, Guardianship & Stewardship. Or: Ownership, duty-free

Here's a puzzle: Both Kant and Locke thought we could not commit suicide or sell ourselves into slavery, and that we had to improve our talents. Locke thought these duties are consistent with self-ownership, while Kant thought that self-ownership was precluded precisely because of these duties. In this paper, I try to make the case that Kant is right, and Locke is wrong; that ownership is duty-free *for* the owner. I first try to demonstrate that plausible duties are not really duties *of ownership*, but general background duties, and, second, introduce guardianship and stewardship as rival concepts that should be used in place of ownership to describe certain authority relations.

James Jeffries (The University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign)
Owning and the Creation of Individual Selves

If we suppose familiarity with cases in which some ideas seem to be our own and other ideas seem to belong to someone else, then we generate a problem for an adequate conception of the individual self. Both my ideas and the ideas of others occupy a place in a single mental life (mine), and we must discover some basis for this mental distinction. I draw on the work of Max Scheler to demonstrate that a traditional, broadly Cartesian account of selfhood cannot accommodate this distinction. I then turn to Scheler's description of immediate, shared experience, in virtue of which an individual self is gradually discovered. I criticize the descriptive adequacy of this view, its reliance on an essentialist account of personhood, and its consequent limitation to epistemological claims. Alternatively, I describe immediate experience as disjoint and discontinuous, and argue for an a posteriori conception of the individual.

Justin Kalef (Vancouver Island University)
A 'Parallel Arguments' Response to Harman's Case for Appraiser Relativism

In this paper, I critically examine Gilbert Harman's case for appraiser relativism. I first clarify the difference between agent and appraiser relativism, and show why Harman's choice to use the argument from moral disagreement as a support for his appraiser relativism is likely the wisest one available to him. However, I go on to argue that Harman's defense of appraiser relativism is nevertheless unsuccessful. I argue for this conclusion in a rather unusual way. I first try to follow what I have elsewhere called a 'parallel arguments' approach to the relativism issue: this involves an attempt to show that, if Harman's argument for relativism about morality is successful, he will be committed by that same logic to relativism about scientific, epistemic, logical and other apparently non-relativistic areas of inquiry. However, the process of adjusting the parallel arguments to make them genuinely parallel seems in the end to uncover the surprising fact that the argument from moral disagreement commits the fallacy of begging the question.

David Kaspar (University of Nevada, Reno)
The Unreal Future

Presentism and the growing block theory hold that the future is unreal. For these theories to be correct, it must be possible for unreal future events to become real present events. This paper shows that such a passage is impossible because the implication of an *unreal* future event *e* becoming real is that very same event *e* is *real* in the future. Because of the paradox which undermines these A-theories, it becomes clear that so long as a theory of time is (i) committed to propositions about the future being tensed and (ii) holds that the future is unreal, attempts to circumnavigate the paradox only run into different forms of it.

Uriah Kriegel (University of Arizona)
Entertaining as a Propositional Attitude

Contemporary philosophy of mind tends to theorize about the propositional attitudes primarily in terms of belief and desire. But there is a propositional attitude, sometimes called 'entertaining,' that seems to resist analysis in terms of belief and desire, and has been thought at other times and places (notably, in late nineteenth-century Austrian philosophy) to be more fundamental than belief and desire. Whether or not we accept the fundamentality of entertaining, it certainly seems to be an attitude ill understood in contemporary philosophy of mind. The purpose of this paper is to make first steps – very first steps – toward a more mature understanding of entertaining.

David Krueger (University at Albany, SUNY)
Hume's Fictional Impression of Self

Hume is famous for his discussion of personal identity in the Treatise. How can Hume say in Book I that we have no impression of self and then in Books II and III refer to a self as well as build his theories of the passions and morals around an idea of the self? This paper sets out to solve this puzzle. In this paper I distinguish between the “self” of Book I and the “self” of Book II. What is striking about Hume's position is that he argues that what we take as the foundation of our personal identity does not exist. What follows from this is that, strictly speaking, the self is a fiction. In arguing for my interpretation I will show that Hume utilizes the same methodology he uses with his study of necessary connection to help elucidate the issue of personal identity. Finally, I will show that this belief in a false self is strong enough to support Hume's work in Books II and III of the Treatise.

David Kuttruff (San Diego State University)
The Socratic Soul - A Defensible Paradox

In this paper, I challenge the notion that the “earlier Socratic” soul differs significantly from the “more developed Platonic” soul revealed in the “later” dialogues such as the Republic. While such a challenge does not argue for a unitarian view, it argues against developmentalism, advocated by commentators such as Aristotle, Terence Irwin, Gregory Vlastos, and Christopher Rowe. I argue that in the Phaedrus and the Symposium, Socrates reveals a fourth capacity of the soul – the wings of Erōs – which if properly developed and organized, drives all the parts of the soul toward a unified harmony. This new orientation allows one to act reliably in a way that may have appeared “paradoxical” when viewed from an intellectualist perspective, but is now realized as plausible. This properly unified soul is strikingly similar to the simple soul discussed in the Phaedo and the Protagoras.

Daniel Lim (Cambridge University)
Conceivability, Property Individuation, and Strong Necessities

David Chalmers’ so-called Conceivability Argument against physicalism is based on a controversial principle (CP) – that conceivability is a reliable guide to possibility. Chalmers treats CP as a single, monolithic principle but, I argue, it is better construed as a combination of two principles: the Property Individuation Principle (PI) and Hume’s Dictum (HD). Breaking CP into its component parts is beneficial for at least two reasons. First, it simplifies the debate by reducing it to a problem in general ontology. Second, it exposes some flaws in the reasoning behind Chalmers’ rejection of strong necessities.

Patrick Lippert (North Idaho College)
The Human Self: A Mare's Nest

This paper is a short exploration of the self in terms of the semiotics of Charles Sanders Peirce. It also utilizes the research of Terrence Deacon at Berkeley, which is based (in part) on this same semiotics. Its thesis is that the self is to be understood as a 'Mare's Nest', which I portray as both an autonomous functionality-a 'thing'-but organized around (and for the sake of) a 'no-thing', which is the next conceivable possibility; and as an illusory discovery, in that this functionality is finally to be understood in terms of instantiating general semiosis. A conclusion follows as to the real seriousness and high moment of any self's experience.

Jacob Longshore (University of Portland)
Pierce, The Self, and the Self-Dialogue of Thought

Plato understands thought as a conversation with oneself; C.S. Peirce agrees with this. What does it mean, to talk to yourself? How is it possible? I examine Peirce's concept of self and thinking in order to answer these questions. Peirce views thinking as an operation of signs that are geared toward future conduct. One idea triggers several other ones, which can then serve to determine how you act. Thinking is an operation of signs, none of which determine themselves. A child discovers herself after checking conflicting testimonies against experience; to explain ignorance and error revealed by this event, she posits the idea of self. The self serves a corrective function, for it enables one to identify other facts and submit them to testing. I therefore suggest that thinking, as self-dialogue, involves positing a future self. Self-correction is possible by testing multiple testimonies of one's own.

Fauve Lybaert (University of Leuven, Belgium)
An exposition and evaluation of Edmund Husserl's answer to the question 'Is it essential to self-consciousness that I situate myself in an intersubjectively shared space and time?'

When I am aware of my diachronic existence, do I then necessarily refer to myself as being an objective particular that is in principle traceable by others in an intersubjectively shared space and time? This is the question that I here wish to pose. I probe it through an evaluation of Edmund Husserl's claim that there could be a consciousness that individuates and unifies itself even if there were no nature or idea of nature. I contest this claim by raising questions that bring out how the constitution of our self-consciousness depends on our capacity to situate ourselves in an objective space and time.

Bertha Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)
Cloning, Identity, and Human Dignity: A Response to Callahan and Kass

One of the most pervasive arguments against human reproductive cloning is that genetic duplication will rob the resulting clone of a unique identity (Callahan) or an open future (Kass). This is because cloning "creates serious issues of identity and individuality... [the child] will be saddled with a genotype that has already lived. People are likely to compare his performances in life with that of his alter ego." This objection can be read in two ways. First, the cloned child is destined to repeat the life of his genetic predecessor and so would be robbed of a chance of living her own unique life. Or, second, although the cloned child would want to live her own unique life, society's expectations that she repeat the life of her genetic predecessors would be so strong as to deny her this important opportunity. Because this harms the resulting child, cloning is intrinsically wrong. I will argue that neither of these two objections are successful against the morality of human cloning, mostly because both Kass and Callahan underestimate the role of nurture for forming unique identity. Moreover, there is ample evidence, both from the human population and the feline population, that the genetic repetition of an individual mammal does not repeat identity. Monozygotic multiples certainly illustrate this point; along with CC the cat, the first cloned feline, who neither acts nor looks like her genetic predecessor. Conversely, philosophers who argue this point against Callahan and Kass overemphasize nurture at the expense of acknowledging that genetics does indeed play an important role in forming our identity. The main issue is whether even mild duplication of psychological traits in a cloned child is sufficient to rob her of her identity. Kass and Callahan seem to think it does. I will argue that it does not.

Tuomas Manninen (Arizona State University at the West Campus)
Constitution View and the Ontological Uniqueness of Persons

According to Lynne Rudder Baker's constitution view of personhood, human persons are ontologically unique beings that are constituted by human organisms. What makes human persons unique is their first-person perspective of the world; having this perspective allows human persons to stand in moral, interpretive, and ontologically productive relations to the world. But which human organisms constitute

persons? On Baker's view, the answer appears to be 'all of them' – even those that lack the first-person perspective. In such a case, we seem to face the unhappy consequence: the ontological uniqueness of human persons results from their being humans. The first part of my paper (§§2-3) will formulate a challenge to Baker's formulation of the constitution of persons (as it appears in her *Metaphysics of Everyday Life*). In the second part (§§4-5), I outline a solution which is developed out of Baker's own earlier work in *Persons and Bodies*.

Thomas Metcalf (University of Colorado, Boulder)
Must Hypothetical Counterexamples be Possible?

Hypothetical counterexamples are a mainstay in philosophical debate, perhaps the most common tactic in attempting to establish some philosophical position, across a wide range of subdisciplines. When tailoring these counterexamples, philosophers choose possible but usually non-actual situations. No one has seriously considered whether these counterexamples must actually be metaphysically possible situations, however. This paper argues that there is no theoretical reason to insist that counterexamples be possible, and speculates about some implications of this conclusion for various debates within philosophy, briefly that this discovery will be a boon to particularists in normative areas of philosophy.

Steven Methven (Gonville & Caius College, Cambridge and the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Cambridge)
The Self in the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations

My aims in this paper are twofold. First, I try to cast light on Wittgenstein's discussion of the Self in the *Tractatus*, the opacity of which discussion has both repelled and attracted commentators. I attempt to clarify its arguments by focussing on the role of the metaphysical subject, and urge that we conceive of it as a universal perspective. Second, while Wittgenstein has no parallel discussion of the Self in the *Philosophical Investigations*, I argue that he deploys the notion of a form of life to similar ends. The two notions, however, come apart in that the priority assigned to the respective roles of language and the world are reversed. This reversal reveals that while Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* account dissolves the realism / anti-realism distinction, the *Investigations* account, while blocking solipsism, leaves room for a form of anti-realism.

Michelle Montague (University of Bristol)
Conscious Occurrent Thought

In this paper, I begin with the question 'What does conscious occurrent thought consist in?' I first argue that the notion of 'access-consciousness' cannot provide a satisfactory answer and that we need to appeal to phenomenological properties. If this right, a further question arises about what kind of phenomenological features are required. Can conscious occurrent thought be accounted for solely in terms of sensory phenomenology, including both verbal and non-verbal imagery? I will argue that the answer is 'no', and that we must appeal to what is now often called 'cognitive phenomenology' in order to say what conscious occurrent thought consists in.

Kevin Morris (Northern Arizona University)
Brute Facts, Knowledge, and Senses of Understanding

I first draw out a sense of understanding associated with the possession of knowledge and distinguish it from other senses of understanding, including explanatory understanding. I then show how recent discussions of explanation and understanding that appeal to the notion of a brute fact neglect the aforementioned distinction between explanatory understanding and knowledge-based understanding. Finally, I argue that this distinction can be utilized to respond to a more general argument against the suggestion that understanding, unlike knowledge, is insensitive to etiological considerations relating to luck

and accident. While I do not offer a positive account of explanatory understanding, the considerations that I advance support the idea that there is a distinctive sense of explanatory understanding.

Kate Padgett Walsh (Iowa State University)
Is Hegel an Unwitting Humean?

Hegel is famously critical of Kant's claim that pure reason can legislate for the will; more specifically, he is critical of the claim that moral deliberation requires radically stepping back from everything empirical about ourselves. The question I take up in this paper is whether this criticism places Hegel in familiar territory occupied by Humeans. If deliberation does not involve radically stepping back from everything that is particular about ourselves, then must normative claims, specifically reasons for action, have their source in desires? This question is of vital importance not only for Kantian and Humean ethics, but also for any attempt to develop a distinctively Hegelian approach in ethics. I sketch a Hegelian response to two distinct Humean claims about reasons and desires. This response rejects normative Humeanism but advances an amended version of motivational Humeanism.

Nicholas Parkinson (Stony Brook University)
The Fragmentation of Self in Photography: Gadamer and Milja Laurila's Images of Forgetting

The purpose of this paper is to explore Gadamer's notion of the continuity of self-understanding through art by presenting contemporary Finnish photographer Milja Laurila's work as both an illustration of and a challenge to Gadamer's thought. Laurila's photographs, which explore the manner in which photography itself links us to our past, at the same time expresses the impossibility of reincorporating the past into the present. First, I will examine how Laurila's work correlates to Gadamer's idea that self-continuity is a task of humanity which is expressed through art. Next, I will propose that the expression of absence in Laurila's work thwarts the possibility of genuine self-continuity, and that Gadamer does not give proper weight to the self's discontinuous and fragmentary nature. I will argue that while the expression of absence and discontinuity lend to self-understanding, they cannot be wholly integrated into a continuous self without ignoring their significance.

Saja Parvizian (San Francisco State University)
An Analysis of the Relationship between the Meditations and the Passion of Generosity

In Lisa Shapiro's investigative work "What Are the Passions Doing in the *Meditations*," she argues that the passions exhibited by the meditator contribute to the meditator's epistemological progress throughout the meditations. Shapiro contends that the passion of generosity arises in the Fourth Meditation and tempers the meditator's desire for knowledge, allowing her to be balanced in her epistemological endeavor and successfully complete the meditations. In this paper I challenge Shapiro's suggestion that generosity is active within the meditations and is regulating the meditator's desire for knowledge. I will argue that it is not until after the meditations have been completed that generosity can arise in the soul of the meditator.

Jessica Pepp (McGill University)
Reference, Semantic Reference, and Determination

This paper connects a dominant approach to studying natural language semantics with a fundamental thesis about how people think - and talk - about particular objects. I argue that an approach to natural language semantics that I call the "formal approach" has strong motivation to embrace what I call a "Determination View" of reference to objects in language and in thought. This conclusion should prompt a reconsideration of the formal approach, since the Determination View can be questioned. It also challenges the view, often going hand in hand with the formal approach, that the study of natural language semantics is independent of the investigation of cognition.

Joshua Rasmussen (University of Notre Dame)
A Theory of Correspondence

A common view of *truth* is that truths reflect the way the world is. That is, truth consists in a relationship between that which is true and the world (or parts of it). This relationship is typically called *correspondence* (hence, *the correspondence theory of truth*). But philosophers have so far failed to spell out in precise terms just what the relation of correspondence *is*. Only a handful of proposals have been offered, and each of these makes use of undefined technical terms. Therefore, I offer a precise analysis of the correspondence relation. The analysis is valuable because it explains *how* a proposition could correspond to something as well as *why* propositions correspond to the things they do.

Carolyn Richardson (University of Toronto)
Learning Belief from Assertion

The paper consists in a defence of a thesis assigning a feature to knowledge of belief: to ascribe a belief to someone is to take him to be deliberately related to the state ascribed. I first offer a partial characterization of belief as a state to which its bearer is deliberately related; implied is the thesis about knowledge of belief. I then develop an account of a specific way in which we learn one another's beliefs: from assertion. When we ascribe belief to another based on his assertoric speech, I argue, we take him to attend deliberately to the state in question. Rather than being a peculiarity of that specific means of learning belief, the ascriber's taking the speaker to attend deliberately to the state ascribed manifests a feature of knowledge of belief as such.

Aaron Rodriguez (University of Oregon)
Hanging by a Narrative Thread: Dewey and Rorty on Aesthetic Self-Creation

In defending Rorty's account of self-creation, specifically his notion of a "poetic ironist," it soon becomes apparent that his aestheticized ethics is somewhat lacking. In particular, it is unclear if and how experiencing the organization of a work of art might actually be of use for us as we weave together our own self-narratives. Fortunately, one of Rorty's intellectual heroes, John Dewey, articulates a wonderfully rich aesthetic theory that serves as an illuminating supplement to the former's figure of the "strong poet." Through the lens of Dewey's views on art, then, we see just how aesthetic experience can help us recuperate our fragmented selves by awakening us to the wealth of possibilities available for our self-creative projects.

Luke Roelofs (University of Toronto)
Consciousness in Spinoza: What is it like to be God?

Spinoza makes several striking claims about mentality, such as that all things possess it, and that human minds are merely ideas in the infinite mind of God. But these claims come without a developed account of first-person consciousness, which has led to confusion and interpretive dispute. I try to cast new light on this issue by making use of Ned Block's distinction between 'Access Consciousness', a functional availability of contents for higher-level processes, and 'Phenomenal Consciousness', the irreducible 'how-it-feels' of experience. I draw several parallels between this distinction of two senses of 'consciousness' and Spinoza's two levels of mentality, God's and people's, and suggest that interpreting Spinoza's substance as a subject of P-consciousness, and his modes as subjects of A-consciousness, preserves what is distinctive in his system while doing justice to commonsense reservations.

William A. Rottschaefer (Lewis and Clark College)
Extending the Extended Mind: The Phenomenon of WE-ness

Advocates of cognitive extension argue that the human mind super-sizes itself by embodying itself in a body, embedding itself in an epistemically agential environment and uniting itself with both in extended cognitive agency. Call this the 3E-ness thesis. In this paper, I propose a strong version of 3E-ness, WE-ness: In some instances super-sizing results in the creation of a plural subject, a WE. I outline the ontological lineaments of WE-ness distinguishing it from other types of 3E-ness and suggest an evolutionary biological model of its origin based on the emergence of multi-cellular life from single celled-life. And I then turn to some findings in developmental psychology concerning we-intentionality and its features of normative and supra-personal intentionality. Finally, on the basis of these findings, I indicate briefly why a WE-ness account of group agency is superior to two leading competitors, summative and transcendental social constructionist accounts.

Dan Ryder (University of British Columbia, Okanagan)
Teleosemantics and Swampman: Defanging an intuition

Teleosemantics is a very promising strategy for naturalizing intentionality, but the infamous Swampman example strongly inhibits its adoption. In this paper, I argue that an empirically plausible model of how the brain works has some consequences which show that the Swampman example is not a concern for teleosemantics. In particular, the model implies and makes intuitive the conclusion that Swampman has non-truth-evaluable but nonetheless genuine mental states that explain his behaviour, via a pragmatic, isomorphism-based sort of "content", in a way analogous to how we explain Davidson's. All of this is compatible with teleosemantic principles.

Walter Thomas Schmid (University of North Carolina Wilmington)
Self and Soul in Plato's Phaedo

Plato's *Phaedo* incorporates four distinct notions: (1) the 'ideal self' identified with pure theoretical and practical reason; (2) the 'particular real self' identified with one's current, fallen state of humanity; (3) the 'particular self-active soul' or philosophical self striving to bring about the transformation of (2) into (1); and (4) the 'particular life-soul,' related to procreation and other motions of biological life. The first part of the essay locates and discusses these notions. The second part sketches their relation to an overall interpretation of the dialogue. 'Human soul' for Plato is essentially related to the possibility of 'divine soul,' but this transformation cannot be brought about fully in the human state, and often human souls fail to know themselves (and others) *as* 'souls', i.e. as aspirationally fully rational, virtuous and one. The realization that a propensity for such self-blindness is a condition of human being is part of the self-knowledge belonging to (3).

John Schwenkler (Mount St. Mary's University)
Mirrors, Misidentification, and the Sense of the Self

I argue on philosophical and empirical grounds that there are cases in which mirrored self-recognition (i.e., the identification of one's mirrored reflection as such) does not depend on an identity judgment, but is rather a case of what Gareth Evans calls "information-based" reference. As a consequence, there are certain cases where the beliefs we form about ourselves in this way are immune to error through misidentification.

Jeff Snapper (University of Notre Dame)
Some Remarks on the Vagueness Argument

Considerations of vagueness suggest to some that composition is unrestricted. Central to this line of thought is the intimate connection between composition and number - when composition occurs the number of things increases. However, the connection is not clear enough, especially if vagueness is semantic indeterminacy. In this paper I argue that Theodore Sider's vagueness argument for unrestricted composition fails because the sub-argument from vague composition to a vague numerical sentence fails.

Robert D. Stolorow (Institute of Contemporary Psychoanalysis)
Individuality in Context: The Relationality of Finitude

I contend that attuned relationality, the other's attunement to and understanding of one's distinctive affectivity, including the horror and anguish that derive from the traumatizing emotional impact of our finitude and the finitude of all those with whom we are deeply connected, is a central constituent of the relational contexts that facilitate and sustain a sense of individualized selfhood and of the often excruciating mineness of our experiential life, indeed, of our very being. In the course of developing this thesis, I have delineated two constitutive dimensions of the relationality of finitude—our kinship in the same darkness and our being toward loss.

Joseph Thompson (Simon Fraser University)
The Empirical Investigation of Mental Representations and their Composition

The postulation of compositional mental representations, and computational neural systems that are sensitive to them, is so central to cognitive psychology that it seems, for all practical purposes, insulated from revision. According to this view, which I identify with the Language of Thought (or LOT) hypothesis, mental representations must possess syntactic structure because only the purely physical, syntactic, features of mental representations could conceivably fit into causal explanation. It is not contentious that the ultimate success or failure of the LOT hypothesis will lie in its capacity to provide explanations, predictions, and direction to research. What is needed, however, is a non-tendentious method for evaluating how the LOT hypothesis fares on these criteria. The best way to evaluate the LOT hypothesis, it seems, would be to formulate research projects whose consequences bear directly on its plausibility. The difficulty is that such research projects seem hard to design. I will argue that if we are willing to adopt some form of construct validity theory, then such research projects already exist. They might be used to reject the LOT hypothesis, or perhaps revise our views on the syntactic structure of mental representations.

Hayden Thornburg (University of Cincinnati)
Emergent Dualism and Personal Origins

According to Hasker (1999) the mind is an immaterial substance that emerges at a certain stage of development from the complex activity of physical simples organized into a human body. Hasker's view is a novel form of dualism, which can be understood by analogy to a 'field of force'. Hasker's argument for emergent dualism depends on considerations about the phenomenal unity of consciousness and reductionism. I analyze Hasker's central argument and evaluate the tenability of emergent dualism. Hasker's account requires that some physical objects cause immaterial souls to exist and, as I argue, souls must originate from specific physical simples. I also argue that, plausibly, Hasker must commit to origin essentialism about persons. Consequently, Haskerian souls could not be independently originated by an omnipotent being. I conclude by proposing physicalist emergentism as a more plausible emergentist view of personal origin.

Janna van Grunsven (The New School for Social Research)

Two Forms of Deliberation - McDowell and Dreyfus on Responsibility in Aristotelian Phronesis

John McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus have been involved in a debate concerned with the question of whether our basic everyday actions are non-conceptual or permeated with conceptuality. A significant part of this discussion is battled out via their different readings of Aristotelian phronesis. Whereas Dreyfus holds that phronesis requires an absence of reasons, deliberation, or self-awareness, McDowell sees deliberation and self-awareness as constitutive features of phronesis. I argue that Dreyfus' reading marginalizes the crucial role that deliberation and choice play in Aristotle's account. Deliberation, as Dreyfus presents it, is a matter of situation-detached reason or rule-application. This unnecessarily rigid notion of deliberation motivates Dreyfus to propose a problematic dualism between so-called ground floor absorbed coping and secondary detached conceptual intentionality. I argue that Dreyfus' commitment to this dualism makes it difficult to see how the phronimos can be held accountable for his actions. McDowell's reading of Aristotelian phronesis, on the other hand, makes room for the moral agent's responsibility while simultaneously holding on to some of Dreyfus's key insights. This, then, puts the burden of proof on Dreyfus, who will have to provide a convincing argument for his non-conceptualism and how responsibility can figure in his account.

Margot Wielgus (University of Kentucky)

The Technological Viewpoint: Its Pernicious Effects and the Possibility of Self-Help

We find ourselves in an age of self-help. Anyone who has walked through a major bookstore in recent years knows about the numerous manuals promising to show us the ways in which we can think and act differently in order change our lives for the better. But, just how much agency do we have in affecting personal fundamental change? Are not such changes to some extent out of our control? Here, I will explore these questions in the context of Heidegger's *The Question Concerning Technology*, where Heidegger lays out the deeply problematic situation in which we moderns find ourselves with respect to the essence of technology: we understand the world in terms of its potentiality as resource, a damaging and truth obscuring viewpoint. Fortunately, we have recourse to some self-help methods. But our own actions can bring us only so far in our attempting purposeful living without the technological viewpoint.

Joshua Wretzel (Central Washington University)

How to Speak With the Dead: Brandom and Gadamer on the Dialogical Relation Between Past and Present

I analyze the relation between interpreter and text in Brandom's *Tales of the Mighty Dead* and that of Gadamer's in *Truth and Method*. I analyze Brandom's and Gadamer's positions with respect to two shared premises: first, that the task of hermeneutics involves navigating a tension between the past of the text and the present of the interpreter; and second, that the dialogical relation is the proper means to negotiating this tension. I show that Brandom fails to live up to his own premises for two reasons: first, his methodology fails to accord the text the ontological status of a Thou, thereby precluding the possibility of a mutually cognitive relation between interpreter and text, and so past and present; and second, it also fails to mimic the phenomenology of dialogue, thereby precluding the possibility of a dialogical relation. I then show how Gadamer fares better on both counts.