United States v. Orozco-Barron

Under the Speedy Trial Act, a judge did not act improperly in granting an ends-of-justice continuance at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. “A global pandemic that has claimed more than half a million lives in this country [...] permit[s] a court to temporarily suspend jury trials in the interest of public health.” United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2022). 

Petitioner assigns error to the District Court for denying his motion to dismiss, arguing that his trial for illegal re-entry did not begin within seventy days of his indictment as required by The Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161. 

Under The Act, the seventy day deadline may be extended if the court excludes days for reasons listed in The Act. One such exclusion is an ends-of-justice continuance granted by a judge after considering several statutory factors. Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500 (2006). Petitioner argues that the court improperly excluded 110 days and erroneously applied “blanket continuances” to all cases during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic. 

In United States v. Olsen, this Court decided that The Act should not be construed such that a continuance could only be granted if a trial was physically impossible. “A global pandemic that has claimed more than half a million lives in this country [...] permit[s] a court to temporarily suspend jury trials in the interest of public health.” 21 F.4th 1036 (9th Cir. 2022). 

The Court found that the district court met its statutory obligations because it (1) specifically limited the time of the continuance, (2) laid out its reasoning that justice was best served by the continuance as COVID-19 had “not abated”, and (3) met The Act’s requirement “by relying on the chief judge orders in effect during the time period at issue.” 

Affirmed.