State v. Rideout

Under ORS 137.690, a person who has been convicted of more than one “major felony sex crime” is subject to a mandatory minimum term of 25 years. If, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ramos, one of the two convictions is reversed, the trial court will no longer have the authority to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of 25 years under ORS 137.690 on the remining conviction.

Defendant was charged with first-degree sodomy (Count 1) and first-degree rape (Count 2). The jury found defendant guilty on both counts. The trial court received a nonunanimous guilty verdict for Count 1 and a unanimous guilty verdict for Count 2. Defendant’s convictions of two major felony sex crimes that arose from separate criminal episodes triggered the mandatory sentencing provisions of ORS 137.690. Under that provision, the trial court was required to sentence defendant to a “mandatory minimum term of 25 years,” unless that sentence was unconstitutionally disproportionate. Because the trial court concluded that 25 years was unconstitutionally disproportionate, defendant was sentenced to the mandatory minimum 100-month sentence required for each conviction. On appeal, the Court rejected all of defendant’s assignments of error. The state cross-appealed, arguing the trial court erred in concluding that the 25-year mandatory minimum was unconstitutionally disproportionate. The Court reversed and remanded for resentencing. State v. Rideout, 303 Or App 504, 465 P3d 255 (2020). Defendant petitioned for reconsideration in light of Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___, 140 S Ct 1390, 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020) and argues that the Court should reverse both counts. The state conceded that, under Ramos, defendant is entitled to reversal and a new trial on Count 1. The Court rejected defendant’s argument that he is entitled to reversal of his conviction on Count 2. Finally, the Court also held that the mandatory minimum sentence under ORS 137.690 is not triggered “because defendant has only one major felony sex crime conviction remaining.” The Court allowed defendant’s petition, withdrew its former opinion and disposition, reversed and remanded Count 1, remanded for resentencing, and otherwise affirmed.