Rogers v. Corvel Enterprise Comp, Inc.

Under Knaggs v. Allegheny Techs., 223 Or App 91 (2008), a cause of an injury is a material contributing cause of an initial injury if it is “a substantial cause that is more than a minimal cause.”

Tri-Met petitioned the Court for reconsideration, alleging the Court misstated a fact and relied on an incorrect definition of “material” concerning the standard of proof. On reconsideration, Tri-Met argued that the Court erroneously stated “that the [worker’s compensation] board had found that claimant had had an exposure to Influenza A at work,” and that the cause of an injury is a material contributing cause “if it is a ‘substantial” cause that is more than minimal. Under Knaggs v. Allegheny Techs., 223 Or App 91 (2008), a cause of an injury is a material contributing cause of an initial injury if it is “a substantial cause that is more than a minimal cause.” The Court clarified that the “fact-of-consequence” definition of material described in Mize v. Comcast Corp-AT & T Broadband, 208 Or App 563 (2006) that it initially relied on has been used in determining the compensability of a new or omitted medical condition claim. However, the Court agreed with Tri-Met that it is not the applicable definition in the context of medical causation of an initial injury. Reconsideration allowed; opinion modified and adhered to as modified.