- Court: United States Supreme Court
- Area(s) of Law: Labor Law
- Date Filed: June 1, 2023
- Case #: 21–1449
- Judge(s)/Court Below: BARRETT, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., and SOTOMAYOR, KAGAN, and KAVANAUGH, JJ., joined. THOMAS, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which GORSUCH, J., joined. ALITO, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment, in which THOMAS and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. JACKSON, J., filed a dissenting opinion.
- Full Text Opinion
Petitioner sued Respondent in state court alleging destruction of property at the onset of a labor dispute after Respondent left wet concrete in trucks without notifying Petitioner before walking away. The trial court dismissed the tort claim as preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), as it was incidental to a strike arguably protected. On appeal, the Court held that Petitioner’s claims were not preempted by NLRA. Longshoremen v. Davis, 476 U. S. 380, 396 (1986) (The “arguably” protected [standard] . . . is not without substance). Accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true, Respondent intentionally caused destruction of Petitioner’s property during the strike, clearly failing the “reasonable precautions” test for a strike action to be protected by the NRLA. Bethany Medical Center, 328 N. L. R. B. 1094 (1999). Therefore, the action was not “arguably protected” by the NRLA, and not preempted. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, 245 (1959). Unlike workers who leave behind perishable food before striking, an act which has been found to be protected, Respondent’s own actions created the foreseeable risk of damage. See, e.g., Lumbee Farms Coop., 285 N. L. R. B. 497 (1987) (raw poultry processing workers), enf ’d, 850 F. 2d 689 (CA4 1988). Instead of merely incidental damage, the intentional timing of Respondent’s strike gave rise to a foreseeable harm to Petitioner’s property. REVERSED.