State v. K.R.S.

“ORS 161.067(3) does not refer to ‘crimes’ at all; rather, it refers to criminal conduct. Conduct that is prohibited by criminal statutes, such as the statute defining first-degree sexual abuse, is criminal in nature whether it is an adult who engages in hat conduct or, instead of a juvenile.”

Youth appealed two judgments of the juvenile court: (1) the juvenile court’s adjudication that it had proper jurisdiction over conduct that would constitute one count of first-degree unlawful sexual penetration if committed by an adult (ORS 163.411), and (2) three counts of first-degree sexual abuse under ORS 163.427. Youth assigned error to the juvenile court’s refusal to merge the three counts of first-degree sexual abuse into a single adjudication. On appeal, Youth argued that (1) had this been a criminal proceeding, merger of the crimes would be required and (2) merger principles apply in juvenile delinquency proceedings. In response, the State argued that the merger principles, under ORS 161.067, do not apply to delinquency adjudications, only criminal proceedings. “ORS 161.067(3) does not refer to ‘crimes’ at all; rather, it refers to criminal conduct. Conduct that is prohibited by criminal statutes, such as the statute defining first-degree sexual abuse, is criminal in nature whether it is an adult who engages in hat conduct or, instead of a juvenile.” The Court held that since the legislative history demonstrates a focus on the conduct of the defendant, not the crime, the statute applies to the juvenile context as well as criminal proceedings. Therefore, since the three instances of sexual assault were not separate events, the counts should have merged.

Vacated and remanded.