State v. Bentley

Summarized by:

  • Court: Oregon Court of Appeals
  • Area(s) of Law: Criminal Law
  • Date Filed: 12-18-2019
  • Case #: A162520
  • Judge(s)/Court Below: Ortega, P.J., for the Court; Powers, J.; & Mooney, J.
  • Full Text Opinion

For accomplice liability, “[a] person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person constituting a crime if: … [w]ith the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime the person: … [a]ids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the crime.” ORS 161.155(2)(b); A sentencing court could conclude that a defendant was disqualified from receiving a lesser sentence under ORS 137.712 if the victim suffered a significant physical injury in the course of a crime, regardless of whether or not the defendant being sentenced had personally inflicted that injury.” State v. Arnold, 214 Or App 201, 164 P3d 334 (2007); Three nonexclusive factors to determine whether a sentence is disproportionate, under Article I, section 16: “(1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other, related crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defendant.” State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or 58, 217 P3d 659 (2009).

Defendant appealed from a judgment of conviction for Robbery in the Second Degree resulting from an incident in which he and an accomplice sought to steal marijuana by force and his accomplice shot the victim in the leg in the course of the robbery. On appeal, the Defendant first argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because he did not intend the degree of force used by his accomplice. Defendant further argued that the court erred in ruling that he did not qualify for a lesser sentence under ORS 137.712 because the injury suffered by the victim was not a result of the crime of which he was convicted. Finally, Defendant argued that the mandatory-minimum sentence for that crime is unconstitutional under Article I, section 16, of the Oregon Constitution.  For accomplice liability, “[a] person is criminally liable for the conduct of another person constituting a crime if: … [w]ith the intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the crime the person: … [a]ids or abets or agrees or attempts to aid or abet such other person in planning or committing the crime.” ORS 161.155(2)(b); A sentencing court could conclude that a defendant was disqualified from receiving a lesser sentence under ORS 137.712 if the victim suffered a significant physical injury in the course of a crime, regardless of whether or not the defendant being sentenced had personally inflicted that injury.” State v. Arnold, 214 Or App 201, 164 P3d 334 (2007); Three nonexclusive factors to determine whether a sentence is disproportionate, under Article I, section 16: “(1) a comparison of the severity of the penalty and the gravity of the crime; (2) a comparison of the penalties imposed for other, related crimes; and (3) the criminal history of the defendant.” State v. Rodriguez/Buck, 347 Or 58, 217 P3d 659 (2009). The Court held that the trial court did not err in its holdings.  First, the Defendant was not entitled to acquittal given that he expressed an intention before the robbery to use sufficient force to support a Robbery in the Second Degree conviction. Next, Defendant did not qualify for a lesser sentence because that injury happened in the course of the crime of which Defendant was actually convicted. Lastly, under Rodriguez/Buck, the 70-month penalty for Defendant’s conduct in committing Robbery in the Second Degree is not constitutionally disproportionate. Affirmed.

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