I.R.S. v. Hanington

The definition of abuse in the Elderly Persons and Persons with Disabilities Abuse Prevention Act is not constitutionally overbroad and does not require construction applying a heightened standard as in State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294 (1999).

Hanington appealed a restraining order entered against him. Hanington assigned error to the trial court’s rejection of his argument that the standard announced in State v. Rangel, 328 Or 294 (1999) must be applied to ORS 124.005(1)(e) to avoid a constitutional overbreadth issue. On appeal, Hanington argued that his taunting, verbal harassment, and threats toward I.R.S. did not rise to the heightened Rangel standard, and the evidence was insufficient to meet the statutory standard. In response, I.R.S. argued that the Rangel standard applies only to the criminal context and not “to the civil restraining order context.” The definition of abuse in the Elderly Persons and Persons with Disabilities Abuse Prevention Act is not constitutionally overbroad and does not require construction applying a heightened standard as in Rangel. First, the Court found that Rangel could apply to ORS 124.005(1)(e) because the speech protections in Article I, section 8 of the Oregon Constitution are not limited to the criminal context. However, the Court determined that ORS 124.005(1)(e) is not overbroad and therefore did not require Rangel construction. The Court reasoned that unlike the statute at issue in Rangel, ORS 124.005(1)(e) contains a narrow definition “focused on types of expression directed at harming the protected person[,]” “imposes an objective standard” that the expression “threaten significant physical or emotional harm[,]” and applies only in a limited set of circumstances. Affirmed.