Pulito v. Oregon State Board of Nursing

Where there is no statutory definition “[the Court will] ordinarily look to the plain meaning of the statute’s text as a key first step in determining what particular terms mean.” Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or 282, 295, 337 P3d 768 (2014).

Petitioner appealed the denial of a request for a different chief administrative law judge (ALJ) and contends that the court erred in the issuance of the denial. Petitioner argued that OAR 471-060-0005 is “invalid because it does not impose a ‘time limitation’ as authorized by ORS 183.645(1).” Conversely, the Board argued for the validity of ORS 471-060-0005 because ORS 183.645(1) “delegate[es] broad authority to the chief ALJ to determine an appropriate time limitation[]” and does not call for designating a specific time frame. When determining the definition of the term “time limitations” the court must look to legislative intent. Where there is no statutory definition “[the Court will] ordinarily look to the plain meaning of the statute’s text as a key first step in determining what particular terms mean.” Comcast Corp. v. Dept. of Rev., 356 Or 282, 295, 337 P3d 768 (2014). The Court found that OAR 471-060-0005 extends beyond the scope of ORS 183.645, its authorizing statute, because it lacks anticipated time limitations to inform a party when to submit a request, and thus creates inconsistency. The Court held that because the administrative rule was inconsistent with the implementing statute, the denial of petitioner’s request for an alternative ALJ was an error. And concluded that the term “time limitations” alludes to a time period “discernable by an individual party at the outset, so that a party may know what is required to submit a timely request for a different ALJ.” Reversed and remanded.