Kamps-Hughes v. City of Eugene
Under ORS 197.312(5)(a), (1) local governments have some regulatory discretion that could have the effect of prohibiting an ADU on a particular property, so long as the regulation is reasonable and related to siting and design; (2) “siting” regulations are those which specify the location of an ADU on a site, rather than where ADUs are allowed in an entire zone based on factors such as traffic, livability, and existing density; and (3) while regulations prohibiting ADUs on alley access lots, requiring a minimum lot size for ADUs in certain neighborhoods, requiring minimum lot dimensions for ADUs, and limiting ADU occupancy in certain zones do not relate to siting or design, regulations limiting vehicle use areas, limiting the number of covered parking areas, and setting maximum dimensions and minimum setbacks for garages and driveways on alley access lots in certain areas relate to both siting and design.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Carson Property LUBA Appeal Inc. v. City of Corvallis
(1) In evaluating housing need, a local government may rely on deficits reported in its acknowledged Buildable Lands Inventory, regardless of whether subsequent re-zonings may have eliminated those deficits. (2) A local government determination of whether a “public need” for certain types of housing exists is not necessarily dependent on or limited to consideration of its acknowledged Buildable Lands Inventory, and may include a need for increased housing supply and diversity of housing types and locations.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Mumper v. City of Salem
(1) Where local code provisions ascribe significance to a master plan’s “goals” as well as its “policies,” a local government errs by approving a sub-area plan after addressing the master plan’s “principles” without addressing the strategies it discusses to actualize those principles. (2) Balancing master plan principles against one another may be appropriate where multiple principles require incompatible results, but it is not appropriate where all of the principles can be complied with. (3) The fact that a sub-area plan furthers the master plan’s principles is insufficient to demonstrate that it is consistent with those principles.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Schofield v. Douglas County
A decision determining whether a condition of permit approval is satisfied is not a land use decision under ORS 197.015(10)(a)(A).
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Kuether v. Washington County
(1) PLSS surveys do not create discrete legal parcels but are simply meant to facilitate the description of land for future conveyance. (2) Under ORS 92.010(3)(a)(B), where no planning, zoning, or land division laws apply, an unrecorded survey is not sufficient to create a discrete legal parcel.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Urstadt v. Washington County
PLSS surveys do not create discrete legal parcels but are simply meant to facilitate the description of land for future conveyance.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
City of Albany v. Linn County
(1) Mere statements in a comprehensive plan that an Urban Growth Boundary Management Agreement governs certain procedures are not sufficient to incorporate the latter into the former. (2) Whether a county comprehensive plan meets the Goal 2 requirement that it be consistent with those of local governments is evaluated with respect to individual development applications, not county code text amendments. (3) A county meets the Goal 2 requirement that it coordinate its comprehensive plan and implementing measures with those of local governments where it provides the local governments with notice of proposed text amendments and an extended open record period, responds to issues raised, and incorporates comments into the amendments.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Marek v. City of Corvallis
(1) Under ORS 197.835(4), defective notice does not divest local governments of jurisdiction over applications but allows parties to raise issues related to missing approval criteria for the first time at LUBA. (2) Because decision-makers are not participants in local proceedings, issues raised by them are not preserved for purposes of ORS 197.763(1). (3) Under ORS 197.825(2)(a), where a petitioner fails to raise an issue in their appeal statement, they have not “exhausted all remedies available by right” and are therefore precluded from raising it at LUBA.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Ellis v. Multnomah County
Under MCC 35.2690, a life estate in real property is a “greater than possessory” interest for purposes of determining whether two contiguous lots were “under the same ownership” and therefore qualify as lots of record under MCC 35.2675(A).
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use