Buffalo-Bend Associates, LLC v. Clackamas County
Where an applicant not only argues generally that the local government can apply only clear and objective standards and conditions under ORS 197.307(4), but more specifically that certain terms in certain local code provisions that the local government applied are undefined and subjective, the local government’s failure to respond to those arguments requires remand.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Central Oregon Landwatch v. Deschutes County
(1) For purposes of establishing a lot of record dwelling under ORS 215.705, a trust qualifies as a “business entity,” and therefore an “owner,” and there is no limit on the number of transfers that can take place before an owner applies for such a dwelling. (2) Where a dwelling has been approved for a parcel but not yet built, that parcel “include[s] a dwelling” for purposes of ORS 215.705(1). (3) Where one parcel is owned by an applicant individually and another is owned by a trust for which the applicant serves as trustee, those parcels are not “under the same ownership” for purposes of ORS 217.010(2).
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Wachal v. Linn County
Under ORS 197.015(10)(b)(A), where a local government, in reaching a decision, is not required to evaluate anything by discerning or comparing, and where the evidentiary support for the existence facts on which the decision relies is clear and unambiguous and does not require the application of any legal principles, such a decision does not require the exercise of “legal judgment.”
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Dooley v. Wasco County
(1) Under OAR 660-004-0028(1)-(2), the mere existence of residential uses near a property proposed for an irrevocably committed exception to Goal 4 (Forest Lands) does not demonstrate that such property is necessarily committed to a non-resource use. (2) Under OAR 660-004-0028(3), conflicts resulting from odors, noise, spraying, and dust are not sufficient to support an irrevocably committed exception.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
McCaffree v. City of North Bend
(1) Under ORS 197.015(10)(b)(H), where a LUCS merely identifies the required future land use reviews without going further to approve or deny them, LUBA lacks jurisdiction. (2) Arguments that the proposed use underlying a LUCS poses a risk of explosion are insufficient to establish that the residents of a city are adversely affected and therefore have standing to challenge the LUCS where the LUCS itself authorizes no development activity.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
York v. Clackamas County
(1) The “primary use” of property zoned RRFF-5 is the use and occupancy of a dwelling structure and does not include driving or walking. (2) Where a criterion requires a finding that something is missing, while that finding cannot be supported by the absence of evidence (i.e., no evidence that the criterion is not satisfied), it can be supported by evidence of absence (i.e., affirmative evidence that the criterion is satisfied because the relevant thing is in fact missing).
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Kimbrell v. City of Lincoln City
Under LCC 14.47.020(D), the required setback from a coastal bluff must be determined before any excavation or grading activities associated with the construction of a single-family dwelling take place.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use
Eagle-Eye v. City of Veneta
Under ORS 197.835(4)(a), while a petitioner may raise new issues to LUBA if the local government failed to list applicable approval criteria, LUBA will refuse to allow such issues where petitioners argue the local government failed to identify the definitions section of its code as an applicable criterion but where petitioners do not establish that the local government was in fact required to do so.
Area(s) of Law:- Land Use