State v Meiser

Under ORS 161.295, the affirmative defense of GEI does not require proof that a lack of capacity is due solely to a mental disease or defect, such that an antisocial personality disorder played no part in the incapacity.

Defendant appealed a conviction of murder and assigned error to the trial court’s rejection of his guilty except for insanity (GEI) defense.  On appeal, Defendant argued that he was not required to prove that his incapacity resulted solely from his schizophrenia.  In response, the State argued that the causation element of the GEI defense required the incapacity to result solely from a mental disease, not an anti-social personality disorder.  Under ORS 161.295, the affirmative defense of GEI does not require proof that a lack of capacity is due solely to a mental disease or defect, such that an antisocial personality disorder played no part in the incapacity.  The Court examined the text, context, and legislative history of the GEI statute and determined that the legislature did not intend to require a defendant to prove that “a co-occurring personality disorder” did not contribute to the incapacity when making a GEI defense.  Thus, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that Defendant had to prove his “co-occurring personality disorder played no part” in causing his lack of capacity.  Reversed in part and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.